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Abstract
Modern civilization relies heavily on having access to reliable power sources. Recent
history has shown that present day protection systems are not adequate. Numerous
backup protection (BP) systems have been proposed to mitigate the impact of primary
protection system failures. Many of these novel BP systems rely on autonomous
agents communicating via wide-area networks. These systems are highly complex and
their control logic is based on distributed computing. Model checking has been shown
to be a powerful tool in analyzing the behavior of distributed systems. In this research
the model checker SPIN is used to evaluate the resiliency of an agent based wide-area
backup protection (WABP) system. All combinations of WABP system component
malfunctions that lead to system failure are identified and classified. The results of
this research indicate that the WABP system evaluated is more resilient to component
malfunctions than previously reported. Possible WABP system improvements are
introduced as well.
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EVALUATION OF RESILIENCY IN A WIDE-AREA
BACKUP PROTECTION SYSTEM VIA MODEL CHECKING
I. Introduction
This first chapter provides an overview of the thesis subject matter and an intro-
duction to the problem. It details the research goals and contributions. It ends with
a review of the entire document.
1.1 Motivation
Electricity plays a part in every aspect of American life from lighting to climate
control, from transportation to communication. As the use of electricity becomes
more pervasive in human life, so too does human dependence on having a reliable
source of electricity. In 2003 that source was interrupted for 50 million people in
the U.S. and Canada, for up to four days in some areas. This outage resulted in an
estimated $10-billion in damages. The cause of that outage is complicated. One key
element identified was the inability to maintain the situational awareness needed for
remote monitoring and backup protection. This inability was attributed to a lack of
adherence to standards [25]. Adhering to these standards can be costly and difficult
as they are complicated and sometimes ambiguous.
The design of existing backup protection (BP) systems has focused largely on
robustness rather than resiliency. Robustness is the measure of how difficult it is to
break something. It is largely a function of using high quality products, precision
manufacturing, and regular maintenance. On the other hand, resiliency is the mea-
sure of how many components in the system can malfunction and the system still
1
exhibit the desired behavior. Resiliency is generally achieved through overlapping
functionality and redundant components or processes.
Existing backup protection systems do not make effective use of modern telecom-
munications advancements. Instead they rely on localized sensors and relays that have
no ability to communicate critical information to neighboring BP systems elements
in a timely manner. Overall situational awareness is maintained at regional control
centers; however, long distance communication latency greatly reduces the ability of
the control center to respond to faults in a timely manner [36]. The response delay
is further impacted by employing human-in-the-loop decision making as opposed to
fully autonomous systems.
Numerous alternate BP systems that employ autonomous agents have been pro-
posed [43, 41, 12, 2, 18, 38, 21, 22]. These agents would develop a partial picture of
the event based on sensor readings passed between neighboring substations and make
more advanced control decisions based on predefined algorithms. The distribution of
these agents would also enable them to provide backup for each other, thus greatly
improving the BP systems resiliency. Additionally, the closer geographic proximity
of these agents and their completely autonomous nature would greatly reduce their
response times. That being said, the logical complexity of these systems causes prob-
lems. It is difficult to conduct large scale testing and the cost of implementation is
prohibitive [39]. These factors make the risk of replacing existing backup protection
systems too high.
The issue of rapidly increasing logical complexity is not new. Software devel-
opment has been managing the impact of complexity for many years. One of the
mitigation techniques they employ is model checking [3, 33]. Model checking uti-
lizes formal methods to evaluate extremely complex systems and identify events and
conditions that would cause the system to respond in an undesirable manner. This
2
research shows that employing model checking techniques can provide insight into the
properties of a novel autonomous agent-based BP systems prior to implementation
and in a cost-effective manner.
1.2 Problem Statement
Proposed autonomous agent-based BP systems have the potential to provide faster
responses to more complicated fault scenarios and reduce the impact of component
malfunctions. However, these systems are significantly more complicated and it is
difficult to evaluate their response to all possible malfunction scenarios. Given that
the response of each component has the potential to affect the response of each other
component, it is no longer sufficient to evaluate each individual component of the
BP systems. Due to this interdependency, evaluation of these systems’ response is
a combinatorically large problem. Small scale examples have been shown to behave
in a desirable manner and this research explores a technique that can verify some of
these systems’ behavior on a larger scale.
1.3 Research Objectives
A large majority of today’s research is focused on developing new BP algorithms
and showing their response to a representative subset of the possible malfunction sce-
narios expected to be encountered in implementation. The objective of this research
is to identify all possible scenarios that have the potential to result in undesirable
system behavior and evaluate these scenarios. The specific research objectives are:
• Develop a model of a BP system implemented on a complete power transmission
network.
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• Identify all combinations of malfunctions in the model BP system that result
in the BP system incorrectly responding to a given situation.
• Evaluate the malfunction combinations that result in incorrect BP system re-
sponses and identify common elements and patterns.
• Compare these results to previously identified responses in smaller scale BP
system evaluations.
Completion of these objectives has resulted in a model that shows the response of
the BP system to all possible combinations of a given number of component malfunc-
tions. Successful completion of the model enabled the identification of all malfunction
combinations that result in undesirable BP system behavior. The evaluation of these
fatal fault combinations allowed for a quantitative analysis of the resiliency of the BP
system as it is and insight to how it can be improved.
1.4 Approach
The approach used in this thesis was both qualitative and quantitative. The
development of an analytical model capable of evaluating the desired properties while
still being small enough to check exhaustively required a large number of details to
be obfuscated [26]. Specifically, the behavior of the power transmission system and
the sensors monitoring it are not modeled. Rather, the input from the monitoring
sensors to the BP system is simulated. This enabled the behavior of the system
to be evaluated against all possible combinations of inputs, not just those inputs
whose cause could be simulated. The results obtained can then be analyzed by power
systems experts to determine the possibility of those input combinations that lead to
failures actually occurring in a real implementation of the system. The development
of an analytical model also allowed for a larger sized system to be evaluated better
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than a physical model would, given the amount of time and resources used. The
development of the model relied heavily on the groundwork laid in a model used in a
previous experiment.
1.5 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 begins with a detailed introduction to the components used in protec-
tion systems in power transmission grids, their functionality, and their application.
It then describes current primary and backup protection systems. Current research
in agent-based wide-area backup protection (WABP) systems is then reviewed. The
test WABP system that will be evaluated is introduced. Relevant research in model
checking is reviewed and finally the model-checking tool SPIN is introduced.
Chapter 3 then describes the overall research objective in detail. It discusses
critical constraints and limitations that impacted both the design of the model and
the evaluation approach taken. Based on such limitations, it also discusses all critical
assumptions made. The components of the model are discussed and the model-
checking techniques are described. Finally, all hardware and software utilized to
accomplish the overall objective are described.
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the data collected. It introduces implications of
applying model checking to the problem. A review of the test WABP system and its
potential shortcomings is presented. Lastly, it provides a detailed recommendation
for improving the selected BP system as well as some considerations for evaluating
future BP systems.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis with a summary of all research efforts and findings,
proposes possible topics for future work, and enumerates the contributions of this re-
search. It shows that this thesis provides further evidence of the usefulness of applying
5
model checking to complex problems and the need to evaluate interdependent systems
on a sufficiently large scale to properly evaluate their behavior.
6
II. Background
This chapter presents information critical to a comprehensive understanding of
BP systems and the use of model checking as an evaluation tool. It begins with the
relays used in current protection systems where notable failures of existing BP systems
are evaluated. The novel BP system that was selected for evaluation is discussed in
detail. Then, the concepts of model checking are introduced. Once a foundation
for model checking has been established, the history of its application to real world
problems is discussed. Finally, the model checking software used for this experiment
is introduced.
2.1 Protection Relays
Protection relays are devices that are designed to trip a circuit breaker when a fault
is detected and they generally reside in the substation where the power line connects
to the distribution bus [19]. Originally, relays relied on coils to operate on moving
parts that would trip circuit breakers in the event of a power transmission system
failure [5]. Each type of relay operates or activates in response to a single, specific
abnormal operating condition such as over-current, over-voltage, reverse power flow,
over-frequency, or under-frequency. Modern microprocessor-based digital protection
relays, or Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs), are considerably more sophisticated.
IEDs can provide additional types of protection by combining readings from numerous
relays and applying logical algorithms before tripping breakers; however, they are
limited to information provided by a single power line, or at most a subset of the
power lines that intersect at a given substation. The two types of relays that are
most pertinent to this research are directional overcurrent relays and zone distance
relays.
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2.2 Directional Overcurrent Relays
In a power grid, current can flow in any direction - both during normal operation
as well as during a fault [45]. The presence of a fault is indicated by a spike in
current, also known as fault current, that always flows towards the fault. The role of
the IED during a fault is to isolate the faulted line by tripping the circuit breaker and
disconnecting the faulted line from the rest of the power transmission grid. Therefore,
it is necessary for the IED to know whether the fault is on the line that it monitors
or on another line that is connected to the same bus. Since the IED is located at the
connection between the power line and the bus, fault direction relative to that IED
is ether in the direction of the line or in the direction of the bus. This information is
provided by a directional overcurrent relay.
Protection areas are bounded between circuit breakers. When the circuit breaker
is closed there is no appreciable impedance between the end of one protection area
and the beginning of the next. A relay, therefore, cannot rely on fault current alone
in order to determine the relative direction of the fault. That is to say, the relay sits
on the boundary between two protection regions and the amount of current passing
through the relay is not enough information to determine which of the two areas
contains the fault. Since the impedance of the line is mostly reactive, a fault on the
line side of the relay will result in a fault current that lags the bus voltage by a phase
angle of almost 90 degrees. Conversely, a fault on the bus side of the relay will have
a fault current that leads the phase angle of the bus voltage by almost 90 degrees.
Therefore, the relative direction of the fault can be precisely determined by comparing
the phase angle of the fault current to the phase angle of the fixed reference voltage
on the bus [13].
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2.3 Zone Distance Relays
A fault current in a power transmission grid has an effect on the entire grid.
Therefore, it is not sufficient to detect the presence of a fault and its relative direction.
The distance to the fault must also be known to determine if the fault has occurred
within the protection area bounded by a given circuit breaker. This is accomplished
through the use of an impedance relay.
During normal operation, load currents are usually much smaller than fault cur-
rents; therefore, the observed impedance of a faulted line is smaller than during
normal operation. This property is leveraged in the design of distance relays by set-
ting a threshold impedance, Zr, which is the expected minimum impedance of the
line during normal operation. If the observed impedance Z is less than the threshold
impedance Zr, then the fault is said to fall within the reach of the relay. This is fairly
simple in principle and application, though, there are some complications that arise
in implementation.
Unfortunately, the impedance of a transmission line is not fixed as many factors
affect the impedance of a line. The more significant factors that affect the impedance
are: the length of the line, the line temperature, and the line’s proximity to other
parallel lines. The transmission of electricity is not lossless; even at very high voltages,
some energy is lost as heat. During normal operation, as the current in the line
increases, the temperature of the medium increases. The temperature of the medium,
generally aluminum or copper, directly affects its conductive properties as well as
causing it to expand. This expansion causes the line to sag and increases the end-to-
end length of the transmission line, thus further impacting its observed impedance.
Additionally, high winds can cause lines to swing, changing the distance between
parallel lines and thereby changing the impact of their respective magnetic fields on
each other, once again affecting impedance.
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To account for the variable nature of observed end-to-end line impedance, the
threshold Zr is set at between 70-90% of the expected end-to-end impedance of the
line. This ensures that any fault that results in an impedance relay observing a Z
that is less than Zr can be assumed to be on that line. However, given that the reach
of the impedance relay is at most 90% of the length of the line, it is possible for Z to
be greater than Zr and for the fault to still be on that line - just at the far end. This
is remedied by the use of zone protection.
Figure 1. Range of Zone Distance Relays
Impedance relays are employed as distance zone relays as follows. Two impedance
relays in each IED are given different threshold impedances: Zr1 and Zr2. The first
impedance relay, call it the zone 1 relay, has a threshold impedance (Zr1) set to 80%
reach. The second impedance relay, call it the zone 2 relay, has a threshold impedance
(Zr2) set to 120% reach. Therefore, if a fault occurs at point P1 on line AB (Figure 1)
the zone 1 relay in IED01 will observe an impedance, Z, that is greater than Zr1 and
it will not activate. The zone 2 relay in IED01 will observe the same impedance, Z;
10
however, it is less than Zr2 and the relay will activate, indicating that IED01 should
trip the breaker.
This ensures full coverage of line AB; however, it has the potential to cause
problems if a fault occurs at point P2 on line BC, which is also within the reach of
the zone 2 relay. If the zone 2 relay in IED01 responds to the fault located at P2
and trips the breaker, it will cut off line AB even though the fault is on line BC. To
remedy this, zone 2 relays are designed with a 0.2-0.3 second delay timer. This allows
the closer zone 1 relay in IED03 a chance to trip its breaker and clear the fault before
neighboring lines are unnecessarily cut off.
These two types of relays are generally used in series with the directional overcur-
rent relay used as a blocking relay. This is due to the fact that the reach of a zone
relay is not directional even though it is set as if looking down the line. Therefore,
any fault on the bus side of the relay that results in a high enough fault current, such
that the observed impedance, Z, is less than Zr, will activate that relay. Placing
the two types of relays in series results in the circuit breaker tripping only if both
the directional overcurrent relay and the zone distance relay both activate. A com-
mon alternative to this configuration is the use of modified impedance relays (or mho
relays); however, their description has been omitted as the system modeled in this
experiment utilizes series relays as described here [13].
2.4 Backup Protection
Primary protection systems may fail for any number of reasons - equipment mal-
functions and inadequate or improper maintenance are fairly common [5]. As such,
backup protection systems are a necessity. Backup protection comes in two primary
forms: local and remote.
Local backup protection is generally accomplished by redundant devices, usually
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installed in parallel, such that if either or both devices operate correctly, the system
will exhibit the correct response. This is the most effective form of backup as it
generally involves no time delay in its response and isolates the smallest portion of
the power grid necessary to clear the fault. That being said, there is a high locality
element to events that result in real world faults. For example, if a substation that
houses a power transmission bus is subject to a natural disaster, such as flooding or
a tornado, it is likely that all systems at that location, primary and backup, will be
destroyed or fail to operate. Hence the need for a backup located in a geographically
separate location; i.e. remote backup protection.
Remote backup protection generally takes the form of remote monitoring or over-
lapping distance protection zones on neighboring lines. As damage to equipment
caused by high fault currents can spread very rapidly through the power transmission
system, remote monitoring is of little use outside of providing situational awareness
and limited response to worst case scenarios which require entire regions of the grid
to be isolated. That leaves overlapping zones as the more effective form of remote
backup. The most common form of remote backup has already been described in the
discussion of zone 2 distance relays. In the event of a fault at location P2 (Figure
1), if the zone 1 relay located at IED03 fails to open its circuit breaker and clear
the fault within the prescribed 0.2-0.3 second delay, then the zone 2 relay located at
IED01 will open its circuit breaker and clear the fault. Likewise, an additional zone 3
relay can be installed in each IED with an even greater reach and longer delay timer,
providing additional backup for faults even further away. This type of remote backup
protection has a few notable disadvantages. The first of these is that the area affected
when remote backup clears the fault is much larger; at a minimum, one more line than
necessary is isolated from the grid. Additionally, the delayed response can result in
extensive damage given that the high fault currents can rapidly overheat equipment.
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Finally, using zone 3 impedance relays may be ineffective if the topography of the
grid is not conducive to establishing a useful Zr [13].
2.5 Wide-Area Backup Protection
Numerous alternatives to existing BP systems have been proposed [1, 23]. The
increased reliability and availability of wide-area communications networks enable
geographically separate components to share information quickly enough to respond
to power transmission systems faults [9]. These hypothetical systems that rely on
wide-area communications systems are referred to as Wide-Area Backup Protection
(WABP) systems [10]. There are two basic communication models, peer-to-peer and
centralized hub. The centralized hub is basically an extension of existing monitoring
systems and suffers from marginally acceptable latency and multiple single point of
failure risks. Combining peer-to-peer communication with autonomous local agents
that employ artificial intelligence techniques results in a fast and redundant WABP
system. Various artificial intelligence techniques have been tested including neural
nets [7], Bayesian networks [46, 8], Petri nets [11, 37], and expert systems [38]. The
WABP system selected for this experiment utilizes peer-to-peer communication be-
tween expert system agents. The agents’ communication is limited to predefined
regions to increase speed and reduce computational complexity. For the rest of this
paper it will be referred to as the test WABP system.
Existing research has focused primarily on developing the expert systems and
communications architecture required to achieve the desired results. Published case
studies are generally limited to very small novel cases accounting for only a few pos-
sible scenarios that an implemented system would encounter. It is generally accepted
that these agent-based WABP systems provide increased system resilience through
redundancy; this has also been shown in numerous limited case studies. However,
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rarely is there an attempt to quantify the resiliency of these systems in a larger scale
implementation. This experiment provides a basic quantification of the resiliency of
the test WABP system.
2.6 The Test WABP System
The test WABP system, designed by Tong et al., consists of three components;
IEDs, Line Decision Agents (LDAs), and Regional Decision Agents (RDAs). Each
IED has a corresponding LDA and each bus has a single RDA. The RDA manages
communication between the local (on the same bus) LDAs and IEDs. Each RDA
is connected to a wide area network (WAN) to facilitate communicating with other
RDAs.
When a relay activates, the corresponding IED may or may not send a signal to
trip a breaker according to the primary protection scheme. Either way, the IED will
send a message to the local RDA indicating the current state of all its relays. The
RDA will then activate the corresponding LDA and pass it a message containing the
state of the relays in the IED. Additionally, the RDA will send a message to the RDA
at the far side bus to ensure that the far side LDA is activated even in the event of
failures in the far side IED.
The LDAs perform most of the logic in the BP system. Once activated, the LDAs
that share a line will coordinate, through the RDAs, to determine the perceived
state of the line. The possible perceived states are Normal, Special, Suspect, or
Faulted. If the line is determined to be in the Normal state, a message is sent to
a higher authority indicating the possible presence of faulty equipment. If the line
is determined to be in the Special state, then directional protection information is
collected from all neighboring lines; that is lines that share a bus with the line in
question. Neighboring direction protection information is used to either downgrade
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the state to Normal or upgrade the state to Suspect. If the line is determined to be
in the Suspect state, then detailed line and relay state information is collected from
all neighboring lines and the state of the line is downgraded to Normal or upgraded
to Faulted, according to expert rules. If the line is determined to be in the Faulted
state, protection actions are taken to clear the fault. Any time the perceived state of
the line changes, the actions corresponding to that state are taken.
2.7 Model Checking
The application of model verification techniques to power systems is not new, Petri
nets [42, 31, 24] and model-checking have been used in the past [20, 28, 27]. Petri
nets are a mathematical modeling language used for the description of distributed
systems [29]. Basic Petri nets that model simple systems are easy to construct and
trivial to verify. Modeling more complex systems requires the use of extensions such
as colored Petri nets [40], which are significantly more complicated to employ along
with being more powerful. The complexity of these verification techniques makes
their use difficult and time consuming. Model-checking has many advantages over
other approaches to BP system verification. Although the end goal is the same, the
process is considerably more automated. Rather than verifying the results using for-
mal methods applied to symbolic statements, the model-checker iteratively verifies
the results in a brute force manner [3, 16]. Additionally, many model checkers utilize
a descriptive language that is similar to programming languages [17]. The ability to
utilize familiar programming constructs, such as data structures, conditional branch-
ing statements, and loops, make these descriptive models easier to comprehend than
intricate graph-based Petri net models.
Many different model-checking tools exist and each has its own set of appropriate
verification tasks [35, 6]. For example, software engineers at Amazon apply the model
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checker TLA+ to the complex distributed systems that underlie their Amazon Web
Services [30]. The model-checker SPIN has been used successfully in a number of
real world applications, such as, the Mars Exploration Rovers and Deep Impact,
in a vehicle malfunction investigation involving the 2005 Toyota Camry, and in the
verification of medical device transmission protocols [34, 14, 44]. SPIN has also been
applied to verify the fault-tolerance of other types of distributed software systems
[4, 26].
2.8 SPIN Background
SPIN belongs to a class of software tools called model checkers which are a subset
of hardware and software verification techniques known as formal methods - the ap-
plied mathematics of design verification [32]. The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA),
which has experience investigating the causes of catastrophic software failures in
aircraft, recommends, “Formal methods should be part of the education of every
computer scientist and software engineer, just as the appropriate branch of applied
mathematics is a necessary part of the education of all other engineers”. Model check-
ing is a verification technique coined by Clarke and Emerson in the 1980’s that uses
optimized algorithms and tailored data structures to efficiently explore all possible
system states in a brute-force manner. The theoretical and mathematical foundations
of model checking are finite automata theory and linear temporal logic.
All model checkers have strengths and weaknesses. Within the scope of this experi-
ment, SPIN has many strengths: it is free and open source, it is very well documented,
it is a mature software product, it is under active development as of 2017, the syntax
of its PROMELA programming language (a contraction of Process MetaLanguage) is
C-based and familiar, and SPIN has several added-on features to ease model creation
(e.g. a graphical user interface and support for auto-generating models from source
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code).
SPIN was originally an acronym for Simple PROMELA Interpreter, but has now
become a stand-alone term. Because SPIN is intended to model concurrent systems,
PROMELA has built-in support for modeling nondeterministic behavior. PROMELA
is technically not a programming language like C or Java, but a systems description
language targeted to the descriptions of concurrent software systems. It was designed
to help the programmer think in terms of the functions of a distributed system, and
it makes it easy to capture common constructs like message passing, shared memory,
nondeterministic behavior, and the atomic execution of instruction sequences.
Nondeterministic behavior is achieved in SPIN through the use of guard state-
ments. These guard statements are conditions which must be met for their particular
branch of the model to be taken. For example, an IF statement in PROMELA can
contain any number of guard statements and execution of the model may proceed
along any of the options whose guard condition evaluates to true.
SPIN has two modes of operation; verification and simulation. The primary mode
is verification, which compiles a standalone program in C from the PROMELA model
(conventionally called pan which is short for protocol analyzer). The compiled pro-
gram will search the possible states that the model can reach and attempt identify a
path that leads to an error that violates one of the predefined operating parameters.
If a path to an error is identified, it is stored in an encoded trail file. When compiling
the pan, there are a number of options available for setting the techniques used to
search the state-space of the model. These options determine the run time, memory
usage, and exhaustiveness of the search. By default, the program halts when the first
error is found; however, there is an option that allows for the generation of all paths
that lead to errors.
Simulation mode can be used one of two ways. The first requires a trail file to
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be input along with the PROMELA model. SPIN will then decode the trail file and
output the details of the path that leads to the error. If a trail file is not provided,
simulation mode will choose a path at random and follow it until an error is reached
or the end of the model. This mode is very useful for debugging new models.
2.9 Chapter Summary
The protective relays are the basic building blocks of both primary and backup
protection systems and provide detailed information about the state of the line to
the IED. The ability to share information between IEDs through high-speed wide-
area communications networks has the potential to reduce the number of cascading
failures in power distribution systems. Coupling this with distributed agents using
artificial intelligence can enable WABP systems to respond to very complex failure
scenarios. While the use of distributed agents clearly increases the redundancy of the
BP system, the system complexity makes it difficult to determine the potential gains
in resiliency. Model checking can provide the tools necessary to model the redundancy
in a WABP system and determine its impact to resiliency.
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III. Methodology
This chapter provides a detailed description of the evaluation tools and techniques
used in the experiment. It presents the system to be modeled, including decisions
made in the design process as well as limitations and assumptions. Finally, the model-
checking tests employed are covered.
3.1 Objective
The intent of this research was to evaluate the resilience of the test WABP system
as applied to the IEEE 14-bus system. This research builds on the previous research
of [15] and expands the evaluation from the localized area of a single line (Line 15) to
all lines in the 14-bus system. The first step in the evaluation was to determine if the
previously identified level of resiliency held when the test WABP system was modeled
on a larger system. Next, relationships between failure patterns and transmission grid
topography were identified. Finally, recommendations for improved resiliency were
developed.
3.2 Design Decisions and Constraints
Many of the design decisions were made in the research that this experiment
expands upon [15]. The power transmission topography selected is one of the smaller
examples of standardized grids used for modeling and simulation. The limitations
and assumptions largely mirror those made in the previous study, whether or not
they were explicitly stated therein. The model checker utilizes a descriptive language
that is similar to C in many ways.
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3.3 Transmission Grid Model
It is a bit of a misnomer to reference the model of the transmission grid, as the
grid is not actually modeled, rather the responses of a hypothetical grid are simu-
lated. However, the topography of the simulated grid dictates the arrangement and
relationship of the components of the test WABP system. The IEEE 14-Bus system
consists of 14 buses, 17 transmission lines, and 5 generators located in 10 substations
(Figure 2). The model topography condenses the buses and lines contained within
Figure 2. IEEE 14-Bus System
each substation and treats them logically as a single bus [12]. This representation of
the system has 10 buses and 15 lines 3. Each line is monitored by a pair of Intelligent
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Electronic Devices (IEDs), one on each end of the line where the line connects to the
bus. Each of these IEDs contains three relays: a directional overcurrent relay, Zone 1
Figure 3. WABPS Modified IEEE 14-Bus System [41]
distance relay, and Zone 2 distance relay. The directional relay indicates the direction
of the fault relative to the IED (bus side or line side). Both Zone relays are distance
relays that observe line impedance. This paper will refer to their settings in length
rather than impedance, given that line impedance is largely a function of line length
[13]. The Zone 1 relay is set to respond to faults on the closest 80% of the line. The
Zone 2 relay is set to detect faults on the entire length of the line plus 20% of the
length of the shortest other line connected to the far side bus.
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3.4 Test WABP System Model
The test WABP system is modeled as a system of codependent processes that pass
messages via dedicated message buffers. In a physical implementation two separate
LDAs are located on either end of each line.
Figure 4. WABPS Physical Implementation
Figure 5. WABPS Model Implementation
In the model, the two LDAs on each line are treated as a single process - a com-
bined LDA. This eliminates the need to explicitly model the message passing between
the two LDAs. This does not have an impact on the results obtained. A message
from one LDA not being able to reach the far side LDA is logically equivalent to a
set of components in the combined LDA failing to provide a reading. Likewise, a
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message being corrupted in transit is logically equivalent to a set of components in
the combined LDA providing a faulty reading. As a result, the RDAs are completely
obfuscated from the model. In the diagram of the physical implementation, if com-
munication between the two RDAs is broken, the LDAs have the information shown
in Table 1 available to make a control decision. This is logically the same as the
combined LDA in the model responding to any of the three combinations shown in
Table 3.
Table 1. Communication Failure in Physical Implementation
LDA01
IED01
- Zone 1 FAULT
- Zone 2 FAULT
- Direction LINE
IED02
- Zone 1 NO DATA
- Zone 2 NO DATA
- Direction NO DATA
LDA02
IED01
- Zone 1 NO DATA
- Zone 2 NO DATA
- Direction NO DATA
IED02
- Zone 1 FAULT
- Zone 2 FAULT
- Direction LINE
Table 2. Communication Failure Modeled
LDA01
IED01
- Zone 1 FAULT
- Zone 2 FAULT
- Direction LINE
IED02
- Zone 1 NO DATA
- Zone 2 NO DATA
- Direction NO DATA
LDA01
IED01
- Zone 1 NO DATA
- Zone 2 NO DATA
- Direction NO DATA
IED02
- Zone 1 FAULT
- Zone 2 FAULT
- Direction LINE
LDA01
IED01
- Zone 1 NO DATA
- Zone 2 NO DATA
- Direction NO DATA
IED02
- Zone 1 NO DATA
- Zone 2 NO DATA
- Direction NO DATA
The test WABP systems exact responses to the two inputs are not the same;
however, all result in a failure of the test WABP system to correctly identify the
faulted line. To exactly model the response of the test WABP system, the LDAs
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would need to be modeled separately. This would increase the complexity of the
model but would enable more accurate evaluation of the type of failure, strong or
weak, and the scope of the impact to the system, which would be the number of
other lines isolated.
3.5 Limitations
The model does not account for back reach from zone distance relays. Given that
distance relays are not directional, faults may fall within the reach of zone distance
relays of IEDs on neighboring lines that share the same bus, even though they are bus
side faults relative to these neighboring line IEDs. This is a function of obfuscating
the length of the lines and the impedance of the buses in the model. The closer the
fault is to a bus, the more likely it is that the fault will be within reach of the zone
distance relays in other IEDs on that bus. However, without including line length
and bus impedance in the model, there is no way to determine how far the backward
reach extends along neighboring lines. Due to the large reference impedances for zone
distance relays on long lines, faults even at the far end of shorter lines that share a
bus would fall within the reach of the Zone 1 distance relay of the longer line. In the
example below, any fault occurring in the purple shaded region would cause the Zone
1 distance relay in IED03 to activate.
Figure 6. Back Reach of Zone Distance Relays
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3.6 Assumptions
All faults are assumed to occur within the reach of the Zone 1 distance relays at
both ends of the line. It would be possible to evaluate the system by adding fault
profiles for faults at either end of the line; however, that would triple the number of
fault profiles to be evaluated.
All faults are assumed to occur outside the reach of all neighboring Zone 2 distance
relays. It is not possible to evaluate the response of the BP system to faults falling
within the reach of neighboring Zone 2 distance relays without defining how far each
neighboring Zone 2 region extends along a given line. Then a separate fault profile
would need to be created for each combination of overlapping Zone 2 regions on each
line. This would result in additional fault profiles equal to the average number of
neighboring lines times the number of lines. In this case, that would be 30 more fault
profiles. This number would increase exponentially if neighboring Zone 2 distance
and Zone 1 and Zone 2 backward reach are included in the model.
Theoretically, the fault is detectable from every direction overcurrent relay in
the entire system. However, the farther from the fault, the smaller the fault signal;
therefore, at some distance the magnitude of the fault signal will be so small as to
fall within normal operating range and will not cause the relay to respond. These
relays are designed and intended to detect faults at most two buses away so there is
not any data on exactly how far the effective range of the direction relay extends. It
is assumed that every direction relay in the system will respond to all faults in the
system.
3.7 Verification Design
The model is initialized to the expected state of the system immediately following
a fault on one of the lines. Then, a predefined number of relay inputs are nondeter-
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ministically selected and modified to an incorrect value. The processes representing
the LDAs are started and execute the BP system control logic and return a verdict
about the state of each of the lines. Finally, the verdicts are compared to the truth
values to determine whether or not the system arrived at the correct verdict for each
line.
There are four possible inputs for the overcurrent direction relays and three for
the zone distance relays, Table 3. An incorrect reading other than no data simulates
the impact of faulty equipment, or corrupted messages, either from transmission error
or a malicious entity operating in the system. The no data reading simulates faulty
equipment or a loss of communication between components in the BP system.
Table 3. Possible Relay States
Directional Relay States
BUS Bus Side Fault Detected
LINE Line Side Fault Detected
NO FAULT No Fault Detected
NO DATA No Data Received/State Unknown
Zone Relay States
FAULT Fault Detected Within Zone
NO FAULT No Fault Detected
NO DATA No Data Received/State Unknown
SPIN was run in verification mode to ensure that all conditions that result in
system failure were identified. Faults on each line are tested separately. It is possible
to create a single large model that produces all of the results for faults on all of the
lines in a single verification run. However, this model is very large and the verification
time and memory usage are prohibitive. Therefore, a separate model for each line
was created, the only difference between these models are the initialization states and
the line verdict that is checked for strong correctness. Verification is accomplished for
up to four component malfunctions and up to four complete IED malfunctions, with
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a total of at most four malfunctions. All combinations that result in system failure
are recorded in separate trace files.
Two types of failure are tested for: strong correctness and weak correctness. The
system fails the strong correctness test if the BP system verdict is not correct for
every line. The system fails the weak correctness test if the BP system verdict is
not correct for the faulted line. Therefore, all weak correctness failures are strong
correctness failures. In the event that the BP system verdict is that multiple lines
are faulted, as long as the correct faulted line is included, the system is considered to
be weakly correct. In real world application, weakly correct responses are acceptable
in some cases as they do clear the fault, even if not in the least impactful manner.
Previous experiments did not verify that the results were unique. The model is
designed such that each component is selected individually for malfunction testing.
Duplicate results occur because SPIN differentiates between traces based on the line
of the model (PROMELA assert statement) that resulted in the system failure. All
verifications terminate when the first assert statement is violated. For example, say
during a verification of two component malfunctions combinations that the selection
of IED01 and IED02 results in a violation of assert statement A. Verification will then
continue to see if any other violations can be reached from this selection of malfunc-
tions. If there is some other assert statement B that is violated by this combination
of malfunctions, then a separate trail file is produced for the section combination.
This results in some combinations appearing in multiple trail files causing the failure
count appear larger than it actually is.
3.8 Chapter Summary
The purpose of this research was to evaluate the ability of the test WABP system
to operate in the presence of component malfunctions. Given the complexity of power
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transmission systems and need to utilize existing components to reduce cost, model
checking was used to evaluate the combinatorically large number of possible malfunc-
tions. This approach required the development of a model capable of exhibiting the
desired behaviors while remaining small enough to run in polynomial time. Once
completed, the model enabled evaluation of the test WABP systems design as well as
identifying questions that will need to be answered prior to implementation.
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IV. Results and Analysis
Table 4. Example of Results
Line15
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 28 7610 564408 552590
1 4 1778 377441 94593 140691
2 101 41035 96163 116327 169401
3 1206 101051 112526 144753 -
4 12352 95736 109910 - -
*search not completed for results > 10000
The full set of tabulated results can be found in the appendix. These results
represent the number of distinct system failures that result from each of the tested
combinations of single component and total IED malfunctions. All results have been
verified to ensure that there are no redundant combinations of malfunctions (see
section 3.7). There is overlap in the results - if a set of malfunctions, A, results in a
misdiagnosis, then any set, B, such that A ⊂ B, will also result in a misdiagnosis.
Additionally, weak correctness errors are a subset of strong correctness errors. Weak
correctness errors fail to correctly diagnose the state of the faulted line, and strong
correctness errors fail to correctly diagnose the state of all lines. Therefore, if at least
one line diagnosis is incorrect then the test for strong correctness fails.
4.1 Analysis
It is useful to differentiate between incorrect reading malfunctions and no-data
malfunctions. Incorrect reading malfunctions are those that result in the component
returning a value that is valid, but incorrect. No data malfunctions are all malfunc-
tions that result in the component either not responding or responding with an invalid
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reading, as could be caused by a communication failure.
The sets of component malfunctions that lead to a WABP failure can be divided
into three categories. Category 1 failures result in an unfaulted line being misdiag-
nosed, Category 2 failures result in the faulted line being misdiagnosed, and Category
3 failures result in the faulted line and one unfaulted line that share a bus both being
misdiagnosed. These sets of component malfunctions are predominantly independent;
however, that does not prevent failures from multiple categories affecting the system
at the same time. Many lines may be misdiagnosed in the same incident, but this
analysis shows that each misdiagnosed line can be traced back to a specific set of
component malfunctions that fall into one of the three categories.
Category 1 Failures.
There are two conditions that lead to a Category 1 failure. The first is simply for
the integrated fault value (Fout) for the line to be greater than the threshold (Fset)
for that line. The second requires that the line enter a Suspect state as well as not
sharing a bus with a line that the WABP system has diagnosed as Faulted. There
are separate sets of malfunctions that can lead to each of these two conditions, some
sets require more malfunctions than others, but all follow specific patterns. With x
as the faulted line and y as any shared bus line:
Condition 1: Fout(x) > 1
Condition 2: (0 ≤ Fout(x) ≤ 1) & (Fout(x) > Fout(y)) for all y
The Fout for a line is calculated by summing the action factors (AF ) for each
LDA on the line. The possible AF values are 1, 0.5, -1, and 0 (Table 5) and the Fout
threshold is 1 for all lines in this experiment.
To simulate a line fault scenario, the LDAs of all unfaulted lines in the system are
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Table 5. AF Calculation
AF Directional Relay Zone 1 Relay Zone 2 Relay
1 LINE FAULT ANY
0.5 LINE NO FAULT FAULT
-1 BUS NO FAULT NO FAULT
0 All Other Combinations
initialized to the starting configuration for an unfaulted line (Table 6).
Table 6. Starting Configuration for IEDs on an Unfaulted Line
IED A
- Zone 1 NO FAULT
- Zone 2 NO FAULT
- Direction LINE
IED B
- Zone 1 NO FAULT
- Zone 2 NO FAULT
- Direction BUS
In the starting configuration for an unfaulted line, the AF value for IED A is
0 and the AF value for IED B is -1. This results in a Fout value of -1. It takes a
minimum of three component malfunctions to reach an Fout value greater than 1 when
starting from this configuration. However, any three component malfunctions will not
produce this condition. Two specific malfunctions must occur in addition to one of
two other malfunctions. The two malfunctions that must occur are: the IED A Zone
1 distance relay must read a fault condition and the IED B directional overcurrent
relay must indicate a line side fault. In addition, either the IED B Zone 1 or Zone 2
distance relay must read a fault condition. The presence of these malfunctions would
cause the AF for IED A to be 1 and the AF for IED B to be 1 or 0.5, depending on
whether or not the Zone 1 or Zone 2 distance relay malfunctioned, respectively. These
conditions are not only sufficient for this condition, they are also necessary. Any set
of four or more component malfunctions must have three component malfunctions in
this configuration to result in this condition. Furthermore, no number of complete
IED failures can lead to this condition. This is a result of the fact that all complete
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IED failures are treated as a set of three no-data malfunctions. No-data malfunctions
specific incorrect reading malfunctions are required for this condition.
For a line to enter the Suspect state in the WABP system, the Fout value of the line
in question must be greater than or equal to 0 and less than Fset, which is 1 for all lines
in this experiment. To resolve a Suspect state, the LDAs will query all neighboring
lines, that is all lines that they share a bus with. If one of these neighboring lines has
been diagnosed by the system as Faulted, then the line in question will be downgraded
to the Normal state. If all of the neighboring lines have been diagnosed as Normal,
then the line in question will be upgraded to the Faulted state. In the event that
multiple lines that share a bus are in the Suspect state, the line with the highest Fout
will be upgraded to the Faulted state and the rest downgraded to Normal. If there
are two Suspect lines with the same Fout, the line with more zone distance relays
reading fault will be the one upgraded to the Faulted state and the other downgraded
to Normal.
Again, we begin the analysis with the starting configuration for an unfaulted line,
with AF (A) = 0, AF (B) = −1, and a Fout = −1. There are 10 separate single-
component malfunctions and one complete IED failure (IED B) that will result in a
Fout of 0 and place the line in a Suspect state. After one of these malfunctions, the
LDAs will query their neighbors to resolve the Suspect state. This is where the second
criteria for this condition comes into play. If the line in question does not share a
bus with the faulted line, the WABP system will incorrectly diagnose it as Faulted.
These criteria are sufficient for this condition but are not necessary. There are a large
number of sets of multiple malfunctions that result in a line entering the Suspect
state. That is why the state was included in the WABP system - to resolve a large
number of possible malfunctions. The only criteria that is necessary for this condition
is that the line in question not share a bus with a line that has been diagnosed as
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Faulted.
The second condition that can lead to a Category 1 failure has not been addressed
in previous studies as their example simulations do not evaluate malfunctions on lines
that do not neighbor the faulted line. The real-world implications of this behavior may
be negligible because the model does not account for generator locations. Directional
overcurrent relays indicate the direction the current is flowing and fault current always
flows from source to ground. Therefore, to meet the criteria for this condition, the
line in question would have to reside between the generator and the fault along the
path of least impedance. Determining the possibility of transmission system having
a line that could meet all of these criteria would require further research.
Category 2 Failure.
There is only one condition that results in a Category 2 failure and it requires
that the Fout of the faulted line to be less than 0.
Condition: Fout(x) < 0
To simulate the fault scenario, the faulted line in the system is initialized to
the starting configuration for a faulted line (Table 7). There are only a few sets
of malfunctions that can lead to this failure condition and they all follow a very
specific pattern. All four zone distance relays must malfunction and read no fault
and both directional overcurrent relays must malfunction and indicate a bus side fault
or indicate no fault. That means that the minimum number of malfunctions for this
condition is six, any fewer and the line would enter the Suspect state and the fault
would be correctly diagnosed when the Suspect state is resolved. As there are only
six components between the two LDAs, all of them must malfunction for a Category
2 failure to occur.
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Table 7. Starting Configuration for IEDs on a Faulted Line
IED A
- Zone 1 FAULT
- Zone 2 FAULT
- Direction LINE
IED B
- Zone 1 FAULT
- Zone 2 FAULT
- Direction LINE
Category 3 Failures.
There are two conditions that result in a Category 3 failure. These conditions are
a combination of conditions that we have already seen. Both conditions require that
the Fout of the faulted line be greater than or equal to 0 and less than or equal to 1.
For the first condition, the Fout of the faulted line must be less than the Fout of at
least one other shared bus line. The second condition requires that the Fout of the
faulted line be equal to a shared bus line, and said shared bus line must have more
zone distance relays indicating a fault condition that the faulted line.
Condition 1: (0 ≤ Fout(x) ≤ 1) & (Fout(x) < Fout(y))
Condition 2: (0 ≤ Fout(x) ≤ 1) & (Fout(x) = Fout(y)) & (Pa(x) < Pa(y))
Where x is the faulted line and y is a neighboring line that shares a bus with x,
and Pa(i) is the number of zone distance relays on line i that read a fault.
Table 8. Starting Configuration for the IEDs on Line x
IED A
- Zone 1 FAULT
- Zone 2 FAULT
- Direction LINE
IED B
- Zone 1 FAULT
- Zone 2 FAULT
- Direction LINE
For analysis, line x, the faulted line, is initialized to the starting configuration of
a faulted line (Table 8) and line y, the neighboring unfaulted line, is initialized to the
starting configuration of an unfaulted line (Table 9). The first requirement for both
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Table 9. Starting Configuration for the IEDs on Line y
IED A
- Zone 1 NO FAULT
- Zone 2 NO FAULT
- Direction LINE
IED B
- Zone 1 NO FAULT
- Zone 2 NO FAULT
- Direction BUS
criteria is that the faulted lines Fout be reduced. There are many sets of malfunctions
that can meet this requirement. At a minimum, one relay in each IED on line x must
malfunction, with the malfunctions being either the in the directional overcurrent or
zone distance relays.
The set of malfunctions that will achieve the second requirement for the first
condition is dependent on the Fout for line x, but all of these malfunctions affect
components on line y. If Fout(x) = 0 then Fout(y) = 0.5 will meet the requirement
and this can be accomplished by two incorrect data malfunctions in IED02 (direction
and zone 2), or by one incorrect data malfunction on either of the IED01 zone distance
relays in combination with any malfunction on the IED02 distance overcurrent relay.
The malfunctions required to meet the requirement when Fout(x) = 1 follow a similar
pattern, but a third incorrect data malfunction is required. This brings the total
number of malfunctions required to meet the first condition up to four malfunctions.
The set of malfunctions that meet the second and third requirements for the second
condition is very specific and rather large in comparison to the other malfunction sets
discussed in this paper. Meeting the second requirement is very similar to meeting the
second requirement for the first condition and still requires at least two malfunctions,
only with fewer possible combinations of malfunctions. The third requirement is
very simple; at least two zone distance relays on line y must have an incorrect data
malfunction and at least two zone distance relays on line x must have any malfunction.
This brings the total number of malfunctions required to meet the second condition
up to eight malfunctions.
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4.2 Implications
Up to this point, the analysis has been focused on the patterns and number of
malfunctions that lead to system failure. In this section the impact of these failures
and the likelihood of their respective malfunction patterns is addressed. First, the
concepts of strong and weak correctness, discussed in section 3.7, will be combined
with the failure categories.
BP systems that are expected to pass the weak correctness test, that is they
isolate at least the faulted line, are the current industry standard. In the event that
primary protection and local backups fail, the outage will encompass more than just
the faulted line. When only accounting for weak correctness test failures, the WABP
system is quite resilient. For the test WABP system to fail the weak correctness
test, it must experience a Category 2 or Category 3 failure. Every condition in these
two categories requires four or more malfunctions, with two or more of them being
incorrect data malfunctions. These malfunctions would all also result in an otherwise
properly functioning primary protection system failing to isolate the fault. Therefore,
an implementation of this system would not introduce any new responses that could
result in failing the weak correctness test.
The number of WABP system strong correctness failures is more disparaging at
first glance. To put them in context requires reintroducing some of the factors that
were obfuscated from the mode. All strong correctness failures with fewer than four
combined malfunctions (single component and complete IED) fall in the second condi-
tion for a Category 1 failure. In the current model, the directional overcurrent relays
will always wake all the LDAs in the system. Additionally, all lines in the system that
are not faulted will have the direction relay on one side indicating a line side fault
and the other will indicate a bus side fault. In the event that the relay that should be
reading a bus side fault provides an incorrect reading (reads a line side fault) or fails
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to respond (no-data), then that line will be placed in a Suspect state. Likewise, if
the IED that is reading a line side fault has a Zone 1 distance relay incorrect reading
malfunction, the line will be placed in the Suspect state. In a real-world implemen-
tation, the directional overcurrent relay indicates the direction of current - which is
always from source to drain. In this case, the drain would be the faulted line and the
source would be a generator. Furthermore, the directional overcurrent relay would
not sense the fault current unless it was on the path of the fault current - which is
the path of least impedance from source to drain. That means that the only way for
failures of this type to occur would be for the malfunctions to occur on a line that is
both on the path of the faulted current and have an unfaulted line separating it from
the faulted line. To determine the path of the fault current would require adding the
generators to the model as well as including the impedance for all the components in
the transmission grid. This is possible as all of the necessary data is provided in the
documentation for the IEEE-14 bus system but would greatly increase the complexity
of model generation. Further research is required to determine if useful data could
be obtained from a more complex model.
This experiment did not evaluate the scope of the faults. Some weak correctness
failures have a greater negative impact than others. For example, diagnosing every
line in the transmission grid would meet the criteria for weak correctness, however,
this is a very undesirable behavior. A better understanding of the performance of
the test WABP system could be obtained by evaluating the number of misdiagnosed
unfaulted lines in the weakly correct cases. Unfortunately, there is no way to measure
outage scope directly with SPIN. The verification terminates as soon as a single line
is found to be incorrectly diagnosed. It would be possible to include additional print
statements in the PROMELA model that could then be evaluated. Then the plaintext
output from the verification runs that fail the strong correctness test but pass weak
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correctness could be evaluated to determine the scope of the outage.
The data collected includes the test case when there is not a fault on any of the
lines. It is interesting to note that the number and type of failures for each test
configuration match those that include a faulted line. Thus, the results collected
indicate that the WABP system is no more or less likely to fail regardless of the
presence of a line fault or not.
There is one final item of note that was observed in the analysis of the collected
data. The use of the certification factor (CF ) has not been directly addressed in order
to try and reduce the complexity of the analysis presented above. In the absence of
generator locations and known impedances, the distance from the IED to the fault
was used to determine the starting configuration of the directional overcurrent relays.
This resulted in a CF greater than or equal to 0.5 for more than 65% of the LDAs
in the system, regardless of the location of the fault. It is interesting to note that
this resulted in lines 02, 05, 07, 09, 10, 11, and 12 having no failures with only
one component malfunction. This resulted in most of the lines with a Fout equal to
one being elevated to the Suspect state. There were few sets of malfunctions that
resulted in a Fout equal to 1, and all of them required more malfunctions than those
sets that resulted in a Fout less than one. As such, the existence of the CF had
very little impact on the observed system response. Not to say that the CF is not
a valuable component of the WABP system logic; however, determining its impact
more accurately would require the incorporation of the generators and transmission
grid impedances.
4.3 Comparison to Previous Results
The results previously reported by Hamman et. al [cite] for WABP system failures
in responding to a line 15 fault vary noticeably from those reported here. These
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differences deserve explanation (Table ??). The addition of a no-data option added
a large number of results. In the previous model all malfunctions were assumed to
be incorrect readings. Also, the inclusion of every IED in the entire 14-bus system
Table 10. Comparison of Results
Single Relay
0 1 2 3
Old New Old New Old New Old New
T
o
ta
l
IE
D 0 0 0 0 28 0 7610 268 564408
1 0 4 0 1778 247 37744 - -
2 0 101 45 41035 - - - -
3 6 1206 - - - - - -
increased the number of failures that were of the same pattern as those previously
reported. That being said when these results are normalized by removing those results
that have been shown to be constructs of the model and not representative of the test
WABP system all of the new results listed in this table go to zero. The reason for this
is that the Zone 2 relays were not included in the previous model, even though they
are present in the original WABP system specification [cite]. All of the previously
reported failures were Category 3 failures. The inclusion of the Zone 2 relays increased
the number of malfunctions necessary for a Category 3 failure from three to four.
4.4 Recommendations
In light of these findings, a number of recommendations can be made. That
being said, many of the recommended actions are already employed in in real-world
protection systems. The model used in this experiment is based on models used in
previous research in order to facilitate the comparison of results. These previous
models did not include the components in question and therefore were not included
in the model used for this experiment. Incorporating a number of these omitted
components is likely to increase the test WABP system’s resilience.
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First, many protection systems employ local backup relays. Combining these
relays in parallel, either logically or physically, helps reduce the likelihood that a
single relay malfunction results in a primary protection system failure. If the readings
from these local backups could be incorporated in the WABP system logic, it would
likely result in greater resilience. For example, if the Zone 1 distance relay local
backup were to be incorporated and the AF calculation modified (Table 11), then
the minimum number of component malfunctions necessary to cause a failure would
increase from four to five. And this is probably not the best possible employment of
the Zone 1 backup, though it still increases system resilience.
Table 11. Hypothetical AF Calculation
AF Directional Relay Zone 1 Relay Zone 1 Backup Zone 2 Relay
1 LINE FAULT FAULT ANY
0.5 LINE FAULT NO FAULT ANY
0.5 LINE NO FAULT FAULT ANY
0.5 LINE NO FAULT NO FAULT FAULT
-1 BUS NO FAULT NO FAULT NO FAULT
-1 BUS NO FAULT NO FAULT NO FAULT
0 All Other Combinations
Furthermore, Zone 3 distance relays with an even greater range than Zone 2 relays
are not uncommon. As with the Zone 2 backup relay, incorporating Zone 3 relays in
the WABP system logic would increase resilience.
Because of the overlap in coverage from Zone 2 and Zone 3 distance relays, it is
very likely that a fault on a line would be detected by some number of zone distance
relays on neighboring lines. It is possible that incorporating readings from Zone 2 and
3 relays on the distant end of neighboring lines would improve resiliency. Likewise,
the back readings from neighboring lines could be added. This can be accomplished
by assuming that an IED with a directional overcurrent reading of a bus side fault
and Zone 2 reading a fault is an indicator of a fault on a neighboring line.
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Based on the results obtained, directional overcurrent relays have a disproportion-
ate impact on the WABP system decision logic. Almost all conditions that lead to
failures require at least one directional relay malfunction. This may be a construct of
the assumptions made in modeling, namely the absence of generators and impedance
values rather than a true characteristic of the test WABP system.
All of these recommendations would increase the complexity of the WABP system
logic and likewise increase the resources required to model its response. It may be the
case that the added complexity would reduce the response time of the WABP system,
which could render it an unviable option. On the other hand, if some of these changes
can be incorporated without significant negative impact, it is likely that the systems
resilience could be greatly increased. Whether or not the system is resilient enough
without modification is outside the scope of this experiment.
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V. Conclusion
This chapter provides conclusions from the results of this research. It details how
each research objective was accomplished. Additionally, recommendations for future
work are presented.
5.1 Conclusions of Research
A high level PROMELA model detailing the application of the logical processes
of a novel WABP system to the entire IEEE 14-bus system was created. The model
facilitates the evaluation of the WABP system’s responses to faults on any of the
lines in the system. The number of WABP system component malfunctions can
be varied to observe the resiliency of the system. Using the SPIN model checker
to verify the model produces detailed output files that were analyzed to determine
which sets of malfunctions lead to system failure. These sets of malfunctions were
sorted and compared to identify patterns. Three basic patterns of malfunctions were
identified as leading to WABP system failure. The malfunction patterns were further
analyzed to determine whether they originated from the design of the WABP system
or were a result of the modeling assumptions. It was identified that many of the
malfunction sets were in fact the result of modeling assumptions. The malfunction
patterns that originated from the WABP system’s design were studied to determine
possible mitigation actions. A number of suggestions were made that may lead to
WABP system improvements. When the obtained results were compared to previous
findings it was determined that the test WABP system is in fact more resilient to
component failures than previously reported.
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5.2 Future Work
The future work proposed here falls into two basic categories: improving the model
and improving the WABP system. Of the two the improvements to the model have
the highest potential for producing valuable results.
Model Improvements.
• Incorporate generators and line impedances. The addition of these components
will provide answers to many of the questions raised in the analysis of this
research. The most significant of which is the impact of malfunctions on com-
ponents that are significantly separated from the faulted line. The question
of the significance of the CF value in the WABP system algorithm would be
answered by this modification as well.
• Determine the scope of strong correctness failures that pass the test for weak
correctness. Most BP systems will eventually clear faults in the system but the
size of the area affected can vary greatly. It would be useful to evaluate how
well a novel WABP system performs when comparing the size of the isolated
area in the process of clearing faults.
• Analyze WABP system responses to faults near the ends of lines. All of the
faults in this research were assumed to fall within the reach of both of the Zone
1 distance relays on either end of the line. Real world faults are not likely to
adhere to this convention. Modifying the initialization of relay readings could
help determine if the results reported here compare to different types of faults.
43
WABP System Improvements.
• Modify Action Factor (AF ) calculation to include local backup relays. A simple
suggestion for an improved AF calculation is presented in the analysis of the
results. This is not a recommendation to use that table, rather an observation
that it seems likely that an improved AF calculation could be devised utilizing
components that are already commonly incorporated in IEDs.
• Take advantage of the bidirectionality of zone distance relays. In the current
WABP system distance relays of shared bus neighbors only indirectly impact
the line state verdict. Redesigning the logic to take advantage of them would
likely notably increase the system logic but it is another piece of information
that is already available.
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Appendix: Tabulated Results
*All values over 10,000 were not evaluated for duplicates, values over 50,000 are the count when the veri-
fication terminated due to lack of memory.
Line00
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 0 0 36 2047
1 0 0 30 485 0
2 0 0 28 9754 0
3 0 0 378 0 -
4 0 0 3276 - -
Line01
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 35 8813 50733 56252
1 5 1985 58003 60819 59297
2 105 36364 67901 72013 74263
3 1120 58654 60941 60296 -
4 7960 57514 61354 - -
Line02
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 0 84 3864 4744
1 0 12 5882 1397 21598
2 0 362 5669 3587 21864
3 5 6266 3082 18427 -
4 112 1447 4314 - -
Line03
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 21 5912 34667 33447
1 3 1382 41706 40150 37224
2 78 27846 54687 46044 48934
3 967 49131 50649 47718 -
4 7611 56080 54116 - -
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Line04
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 7 1957 11208 10986
1 1 434 12117 12034 11595
2 23 7894 15267 12982 18084
3 258 11970 12153 14758 -
4 1875 13697 13426 - -
Line05
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 0 28 1392 1420
1 0 4 2078 2412 1476
2 0 140 2040 486 4058
3 6 3518 529 2739 -
4 130 1401 1393 - -
Line06
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 7 2102 16909 15665
1 1 491 16644 17046 68388
2 28 9796 29695 29122 76103
3 382 20652 21389 59360 -
4 3327 26942 27212 - -
Line07
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 0 0 18 2021
1 0 0 88 592 53569
2 0 28 460 9916 53846
3 7 2115 1100 40953 -
4 139 1392 4837 - -
Line08
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 7 2112 16882 16150
1 1 499 17777 19776 70008
2 29 9892 29292 30678 54816
3 390 22235 23055 63518 -
4 3278 28000 27963 - -
Line09
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 0 160 5261 2940
1 0 36 3673 3914 56363
2 2 1501 11824 13725 81355
3 55 6258 6749 47956 -
4 719 12172 10949 - -
Line10
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 0 94 4726 4527
1 0 20 8037 3095 66138
2 1 800 2330 12974 87489
3 30 2980 4983 50963 -
4 404 3712 7442 - -
Line11
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 0 122 6088 4348
1 0 24 1594 2974 66248
2 1 924 2492 13174 77672
3 30 3348 4570 50671 -
4 413 3598 8137 - -
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Line12
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 0 94 4766 4604
1 0 20 8010 2933 66182
2 1 798 2247 13034 65990
3 30 3736 4857 48710 -
4 401 3592 7824 - -
Line13
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 35 10026 71250 82336
1 5 2146 100885 106080 151055
2 120 47514 112753 131987 179852
3 1389 119162 128257 161216 -
4 15802 118870 130307 - -
Line14
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 28 7702 58526 49047
1 4 1817 88273 69202 118267
2 104 39516 84654 81076 126731
3 1276 100780 84963 116449 -
4 12607 95847 80262 - -
Line15
Single Relay
0 1 2 3 4
T
o
ta
l
IE
D
0 0 28 7610 564408 552590
1 4 1778 377441 94593 140691
2 101 41035 96163 116327 169401
3 1206 101051 112526 144753 -
4 12352 95736 109910 - -
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Modern civilization relies heavily on having access to reliable power sources. Recent history has shown that present day
protection systems are not adequate. Numerous backup protection (BP) systems have been proposed to mitigate the
impact of primary protection system failures. Many of these novel BP systems rely on autonomous agents communicating
via wide-area networks. These systems are highly complex and their control logic is based on distributed computing.
Model checking has been shown to be a powerful tool in analyzing the behavior of distributed systems. In this research
the model checker SPIN is used to evaluate the resiliency of an agent based wide-area backup protection (WABP)
system. All combinations of WABP system component malfunctions that lead to system failure are identified and
classified. The results of this research indicate that the WABP system evaluated is more resilient to component
malfunctions than previously reported. Possible WABP system improvements are introduced as well.
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